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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study we investigate the impact of conventional and unconventional measures 
made by central banks and rating announcements made by rating agencies on peripheral 
bonds correlations during the financial crisis (2007-2009) and the sovereign debt crisis 
(2010-2013). Previously, we estimate these correlations using the Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (DCC) model proposed by Engle (2002). Our results reveal that peripheral 
bond markets became less integrated during the sovereign debt crisis and we find that 
negative news on interest rates and Quantitative Easing (QE) announcements had a 
negative impact on dynamic correlations and provided diversification opportunities. The 
effect of downgrades was also negative in most of the cases suggesting that the 
increased sovereign risk among peripheral countries lead to lower correlations. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: sovereign debt crisis, dynamic conditional correlations, peripheral 
European countries, interest rate surprises, Quantitative Easings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the period 2007-2013 Europe has experienced one of its worst economic crises. 
It is a crisis that has caused a greater impact on those countries that had both fiscal and 
financial problems in their economies and labor markets. Our study focuses on the 
impact of this turbulent period in the bonds of peripheral economies, commonly called 
“PIGS”, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. We analyze the relation among 
themselves as well as their relation with the European reference, Germany, with the aim 
of exploring the implications of the turmoil period on portfolio diversification. We also 
explore the effect of monetary policy and rating announcements on the relationship of 
bond markets.  
 
Recent literature has been interested in analyzing European government bond markets. 
Initial studies focused on the role that the European Monetary Union (EMU) played in 
the process of financial integration of European Union (EU)-15 bond markets (see 
Geyer et al., 2004; Pagano and von Thadden, 2004; Kim et al. 2006; Gomez-Puig, 2009 
and 2009 and Abad et al., 2010). However, since the onset of the financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, the focus has moved to the impact of these 
crises on European government bond market integration (see Pozzi and Wolswijk, 2012; 
Cipollini et al., 2013; Abad et al., 2014 and Christiansen, 2014). 
 
On the other hand, a number of studies have analyzed the impact of macroeconomic 
news releases on financial markets (see Fleming and Remolona (1999), Gürkaynaket al. 
(2005), and Andersen et al. (2007) among others). These studies differ in terms of the 
panel of economic news considered, the financial instrument, the frequency of 
observation and the time period examined. Hence, findings regarding which news 
systematically moves markets, as well as their relative importance, are sometimes 
conflicting. 
 
Our study makes a number of contributions to the relevant literature. First, we analyze 
the evolution of the correlation among peripheral Government Bond markets while the 
previous literature has focused on the correlation of each bond market with the 
European reference (see Abad and Chuliá, 2014). Second, we analyze the effects of 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy announcements made by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve (FED) and the Bank of England 
(BoE) on the correlation of bond markets employing announcement data which has 
been previously used by Fawley & Neely (2013) and Tatiana (2013) to examine the impact of 
QE announcements on the stock markets of developing economies. The prior literature does 
not consider the effect of unconventional announcements. Third, we also look at the 
effects of downgrades and upgrades announcements made by rating agencies. Finally, 
our sample includes the financial and the sovereign debt crises which enable us to 
analyze whether the effects of news announcements are different in both periods. 
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To carry on with the study, we use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) 
multivariate model of Engle (2002) and then we use the correlations estimated as a 
dependent variable in regression equations with dummy variables that enables us to 
explore the effects of monetary policy and rating announcements on correlations and if 
their impact differs across crises. The sample period goes from 2007 to 2013 when 
investors have sought to move their investments towards more reliable and robust 
markets, always trying to avoid markets that may have contagion symptoms. 
 
Several important findings stem from our analysis. First, we find that peripheral 
countries became less integrated during the sovereign crisis due to the growing 
uncertainty. Second, we find that positive surprises during the sovereign debt crisis, had 
a negative impact on dynamic correlations and provided diversification opportunities 
while, negative surprises, lead to an increase of correlations. Also, we find that the 
impact of surprises on correlations was higher during the sovereign debt crisis rather 
than the financial crisis. Third, results show that QE announcements had a negative 
impact on correlations during the sovereign debt crisis, suggesting diversification 
opportunities. Finally, we find that downgrades made by rating agencies had a negative 
impact on correlations as well. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data employed and 
Section 3 explains the model and the methodology applied. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. DATA 
 
2.1. BOND YIELDS 
 
We collect daily bond yields from BLOOMBERG and DATASTREAM 
INTERNACIONAL for five peripheral countries: Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece. We also collect data for Germany as a European reference. The inclusion of the 
German bond yield in the sample is due to the fact that this market serves as a European 
reference to compare against peripheral bond yields. 
 
The data runs from 1rst August 2007 through 31th December 2013. Weekend days are 
excluded. As a result, we have 1675 observations for each country. In order to be able to 
compare the results between the financial crisis and the Sovereign debt crisis, we will 
analyze two periods of time. The financial crisis goes from August 1, 2007 to December 
31, 2009 and the Sovereign debt crisis goes from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 
2013. These yield bonds are transformed into daily rates of returns taking the first 
difference of the natural log of each bond yield. 
 
First of all, we apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic in order to show if 
each bond yield data is stationary. This test has the unit root as the null hypothesis. 
Table 1 shows the results of the statistic tests for bond yields and bond returns. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 𝑝𝑡(𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐)  𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑟𝑡 (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐)  𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
 
    
Unit root statistics         
Spain -2.206 (0.204) -23.437 (0.000) 
Greece -1.418 (0.574) -36.522 (0.000) 
Ireland -1.178 (0.685) -35.512 (0.000) 
Italy -2.423 (0.135) -29.824 (0.000) 
Portugal -1.382 (0.592) -22.706 (0.000) 
Germany -1.529 (0.518) -39.695 (0.000) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. Results have been achieved using Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistic from E-VIEWS. 𝑝𝑡  
are the yield bonds and 𝑟𝑡  are the returns. Source: own elaboration. 
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Looking at the results, we can conclude for each country that bond yield data series are 
non-stationary while their returns are stationary. 
Table 2 shows some summary statistics for the bond yields. Specifically, we report 
information on the mean, standard deviation, skewness coefficient, kurtosis coefficient, 
and the Jarque–Bera normality test. This information is important to have a first sight of 
the behavior of bond yields of peripheral countries and Germany during the financial 
and sovereign crises. 
 
TABLE 2 
  Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 
     
Summary statistics           
Spain 4.71 0.742 0.933 3.318 250.433 
Greece 10.988 7.177 1.182 3.394 401.098 
Ireland 5.804 2.071 1.38 4.356 660.697 
Italy 4.658 0.664 1.392 4.921 798.781 
Portugal 6.494 2.605 1.041 2.908 303.416 
Germany 2.747 0.978 0.084 1.782 105.383 
Note:  Summary statistics have been obtained using E-VIEWS. Source: own elaboration. 
 
As we expected, Greece has the greatest mean (10.998) while Germany has the lowest 
(2.747). This is due to the fact that Greece has had more problems during the financial 
and sovereign debt crisis to pay his debt as we will see later. The standard deviation will 
be the first step to see the volatility that each country reports. Greece has the greatest 
value (7.177) while Germany (as a reference) has the lowest (0.978). 
 
For all bond markets the skewness is positive, which means that there are more values 
to the right of the mean while the kurtosis poses a platykurtic distribution and, therefore, 
a softer than a Normal elevation. Finally, the Jarque–Bera test confirms the existence of 
skewness and kurtosis and rejects the null hypothesis of normality. 
 
Figure 1 displays the daily evolution of the bond yields in the analyzed period for each 
country. It is observed that Greece is the most unstable bond with a peak of 30.59. We 
find that yield bonds of peripheral countries experienced increases during 2011-2012 
due to the growth of the uncertainty in this period of time while the European reference 
experienced a decreasing of its bond yield. Spain and Italy were the peripheral countries 
with lower increasing despite of the volatility displayed. 
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FIGURE 1 
  
  
  
Note:  Daily evolution of the peripheral and Germany bond yields. Source: own elaboration.  
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2.2. NEWS VARIABLES (ANNOUNCEMENT DATA) 
 
Announcement data has been provided by BLOOMBERG and consists on unexpected 
changes in policy rates by the FED and the ECB (see Chulia and Abad, 2014), 
Quantitative Easings made by ECB, FED and BoE (see Fawley, Neely, 2013), changes 
in rating upgrades and rating downgrades in each peripheral country and the European 
reference. This data runs from 1rst August 2007 through 31th December 2013. 
 
2.2.1. Changes in policyrates 
 
An important finding in the existing literature about policyrates is that only the surprise 
component of monetary policy has a significant effect on asset returns whereas the 
effect of expected policy actions is statistically insignificant (see Bomfin, 2003, Bernake 
and Kuttner, 2005, and Chulià and Abad (2014) among others). For this reason, we 
follow Kuttner (2001) to compute the “surprise effect”. For an event taking place on day 
d, the unexpected, or “surprise” target rate change can be calculated as the change in the 
rate implied by the current-month futures contract, scaled up by a factor related to the 
number of days in the month affected by the change. In conclusion, we obtain the 
“surprise effect” as: 
 
𝑆 =
𝐷
𝐷 − 𝑑
(𝑓𝑑 − 𝑓𝑑−1)          (2) 
 
where D is the number of the days in the month and 𝑓𝑑 is the current-month futures rate 
at the end of the announcement day d. Due to the fact that in the US the futures 
contract's payoff depends on the monthly average Federal funds rate, Kuttner (2001) 
uses a scaled version of the one-day change in current month federal funds future rate, 
and the scaled factor is included to reflect the number of remaining days in the month, 
which are affected by the change. This scaled factor is not necessary to obtain a measure 
of the surprise in the ECB announcement and, following Bredinet al. (2007), we proxy 
surprise changes in the ECB policy rate by the one-day change in the three-month 
Euribor futures rate. 
 
We separate negative and positive surprises by the BCE and the FED in order to 
investigate if their effects in correlations are different.  A positive surprise means that 
the monetary policy rate was increased more or decreased less than markets anticipated. 
This represents bad news for bonds. In the same way, a negative surprise implies that 
the monetary policy rate ended up lower than expected, this is good news for bonds. 
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2.2.2. Quantitative Easings 
 
Quantitative Easings are a kind of unconventional monetary policy measures where 
central banks purchase government securities in order to lower interest rates and 
increase the money supply. These measures have increased during the financial crisis 
and, specially, during the sovereign debt crisis. For instance BCE, FED and BoE have 
made important announcements of bonds purchases as we see in Tables 3, 4 and 5: 
 
TABLE 3 
Date Program Event Brief Description 
 
   
QE announcements by the Federal Reserve 
 
11/25/2008 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
LSAPs announced: Fed will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt and $500 
billion in MBS. 
12/01/2008 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries. 
12/16/2008 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries by FOMC. 
1/28/2009 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT Fed stands ready to expand QE and buy Treasuries. 
3/18/2009 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
LSAPs expanded: Fed will purchase $1150 billion in long-term Treasuries, 
MBS and GSE debt 
08/12/2009 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
LSAPs slowed: All purchases will finish by the end of October, not mid-
September. 
9/23/2009 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
LSAPs slowed: Agency debt and MBS purchases will finish at the end of 
2010:Q1. 
11/04/2009 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT LSAPs downsized: Agency debt purchases will finish at $175 billion. 
08/10/2010 QE1 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
Balance sheet maintained: The Fed will reinvest principal payments from 
LSAPs in Treasuries. 
8/27/2010 QE2 Bernake Speech 
Bernanke suggests role for additional QE “should further action prove 
necessary.” 
9/21/2010 QE2 
FOMC 
STATEMENT FOMC emphasizes low inflation 
10/12/2010 QE2 
FOMC minutes 
released 
FOMC members’ “sense” is that “[additional] accommodation may be 
appropriate before long.” 
10/15/2010 QE2 Bernake Speech Bernanke reiterates that Fed stands ready to further ease policy. 
11/03/2010 QE2 
FOMC 
STATEMENT QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries. 
6/22/2011 QE2 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
QE2 finishes: Treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of month, as 
scheduled 
9/21/2011 
Maturiry 
Extension
Program 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
(“Operation Twist”) announced: The Fed will purchase $400 billion of 
Treasuries  
6/20/2012 
Maturiry 
Extension
Program 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
The Fed will continue to purchase long-term securities and sell short-term 
securities  
8/22/2012 QE3 
FOMC minutes 
released 
FOMC members “additional monetary accommodation would likely be 
warranted fairly soon…” 
9/13/2012 QE3 
FOMC 
STATEMENT QE3 announced: The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month  
12/12/2012 QE3 
FOMC 
STATEMENT 
QE3 expanded: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion of long-term 
Treasuries per month 
Source: Fawley, Neely, 2013 
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TABLE 4 
Date Program Event Brief Description 
 
   
QE announcements by the European Central Bank 
  
3/28/2008 LTRO 
Governing Council press 
release LTRO expanded: 6-month LTROs are announced 
10/15/2008 FRFA 
Governing Council press 
release Refinancing operations expanded 
05/07/2009 
CBPP/LT
RO 
Governing Council press 
release The ECB will purchase €60 billion in euro-denominated covered bonds 
05/10/2010 SMP 
Governing Council press 
release 
The ECB will conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt 
securities markets 
6/30/2010 CBPP 
Governing Council press 
release Purchases finish on schedule 
10/06/2011 CBPP2 
Governing Council press 
release The ECB will purchase €40 billion in euro-denominated covered bonds 
12/08/2011 LTRO 
Governing Council press 
release 36-month LTROs are announced 
08/02/2012 OMT ECB press conference Mario Draghi indicates that the ECB will expand sovereign debt purchases 
09/06/2012 OMT 
Governing Council press 
release Debt purchased in unlimited amounts on the secondary market by the ECB. 
Source: Fawley, Neely, 2013 
 
TABLE 5 
Date Program Event Brief Description 
 
   
QE announcements by the Bank of England 
  
1/19/2009 APF 
HM Treasury 
statement The BOE will purchase up to £50 billion of “high quality private sector" 
02/11/2009 APF 
BOE Inflation 
Report The BOE views a slight downside risk to meeting the inflation target 
03/05/2009 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £75 billion in assets 
05/07/2009 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £125 billion in assets 
08/06/2009 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £175 billion in assets 
11/05/2009 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £200 billion in assets. 
02/04/2010 APF MPC statement 
The BOE maintains the stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of reserves 
at £200 billion 
10/06/2011 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £275 billion in assets financed by reserve issuance 
11/29/2011 APF 
HM Treasury 
decision HM Treasury lowers the ceiling 
02/09/2012 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £325 billion in assets 
07/05/2012 APF MPC statement The BOE will purchase up to £375 billion in assets 
Source: Fawley, Neely, 2013 
 
This data has been provided by Fawley and Neely (2013) in Four Stories of 
Quantitative Easings. In this paper they present a brief description of each 
announcement of purchases by the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the 
Bank of England as well as each purchase date provided by Tatiana (2013). 
 14 
 
2.2.3. Ratings 
 
It is known that upgrades and downgrades in each peripheral country have had 
important consequences in their economies and we try to investigate their effect on the 
correlations of peripheral bond markets during the financial and sovereign debt crisis. 
Results could be important to show the behavior of these bond markets in the period of 
time investigated. Ratings have been separated into upgrades and downgrades to 
analyze if their effects on correlations are different. Table 6 displays downgrades and 
upgrades dates announced by S&P. 
 
TABLE 6 
Date Country Date Country 
 
 
  
Downgrades announcements Upgrades announcements 
02/07/2009 Ireland 29/11/2013 
 
Greece 
22/12/2009 Greece   
22/04/2010 Greece   
14/06/2010 Greece   
13/07/2010 Portugal   
19/07/2010 Ireland   
30/09/2010 Spain   
17/12/2010 Ireland   
07/03/2011 Greece   
10/03/2011 Spain   
15/03/2011 Portugal   
05/04/2011 Portugal   
15/04/2011 Ireland   
01/06/2011 Greece   
05/07/2011 Portugal   
12/07/2011 Ireland   
25/07/2011 Greece   
04/10/2011 Italy   
18/10/2011 Spain   
13/02/2012 Spain, Italy and Portugal   
02/03/2012 Greece   
13/06/2012 Spain   
13/07/2012 Italy   
                 Source: own elaboration. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Our study adopts two steps in order to explore the effects of the economic measures on 
each pair of bond yield correlations. First, we estimate the conditional correlation 
between each pair of bond yields using the DCC model of Engle (2002) and then we 
introduce these correlations as dependent variables in regression equations while the 
economic measures will be introduced as dummy variables. This approach will allow us 
obtain the impact of the interest rate changes, unconventional measures and rating 
announcements on peripheral bond market correlations. 
 
3.1. DYNAMIC CONDITIONAL CORRELATION MODEL 
 
The DCC model was proposed by Engle (2002) as a time - varying generalization of the 
constant conditional correlation (CCC) estimator proposed previously by Bollerslev 
(1990). In the CCC model the covariance matrix can be expressed as the product of the 
diagonal matrix of standard deviations and the correlation matrix: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝐷𝑡           (3) 
Where: 
 𝑅 contains a correlation matrix with constant conditional correlations 
 𝐷𝑡 contains a diagonal matrix of standard deviations being 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{√ℎ𝑖,𝑡}          (4) 
 
Engle (2002) proposed a time– varying correlation (𝑅𝑡) in his work Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation: A simple Class of Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity Models with the following covariance matrix: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡           (5) 
 
This model allows us to obtain the dynamic conditional correlations between each pair 
of bond market correlations. As Engle (2002) proposed, we will estimate correlations in 
two steps. Firstly, we estimate a univariate GARCH(1,1) model for each variable and, 
secondly, the estimated variances are introduced as inputs in the estimation process. In 
equation (5): 
 𝑅𝑡 contains a time-varying correlation matrix with dynamic conditional 
correlations. 
 𝐷𝑡  contains a diagonal matrix of standard deviations. 
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 𝐻𝑡 contains a matrix of variances and covariances. 
 
 
In other words: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = [
𝜎1
2 ⋯ 𝜎1,𝑛
2
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜎1,𝑛
2 ⋯ 𝜎𝑛
2
]
𝑡
, 𝑅𝑡 = [
1 ⋯ 𝜌1,𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜌1,𝑛 ⋯ 1
]
𝑡
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑡 = [
√ℎ1,1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ √ℎ𝑖,𝑡
]
𝑡
          (6) 
 
or equivalently, 
 
[
𝜎1
2 ⋯ 𝜎1,𝑛
2
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜎1,𝑛
2 ⋯ 𝜎𝑛
2
]
𝑡
= [
√ℎ1,1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ √ℎ𝑖,𝑡
]
𝑡
[
1 ⋯ 𝜌1,𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜌1,𝑛 ⋯ 1
]
𝑡
[
√ℎ1,1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ √ℎ𝑖,𝑡
]
𝑡
          (7) 
 
Where ℎ𝑖,𝑡  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛 shape a variance equation following a univariate GARCH 
(1,1) equation. We can also rewrite equation (5) as follows to obtain the correlation 
matrix: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡
−1𝐻𝑡𝐷𝑡
−1          (8) 
Then, the standardized residuals are used to estimate the conditional correlations as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑡 = (𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2𝑄𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡))
−1/2          (9) 
 
Where 
 𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑄𝑡̅̅ ̅ + 𝛼(𝜀𝑡−1 , 𝜀𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝛽𝑄𝑡−1          (10), being 𝑄𝑡̅̅ ̅ the 
unconditional covariance of the standardized residuals. 
In equation (10), parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are scalars and allow this model to have a 
reverting mean if 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1 
Finally, we obtain the time-varying correlation coefficient as: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
√𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡
; 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 … 𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗          (11)   
 
To sum up, we estimate the following equations in order to obtain the correlations: 
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𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛾1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2           (12) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖,1𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖,1ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛          (13) 
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑄𝑡̅̅ ̅ + 𝛼(𝜀𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝛽𝑄𝑡−1 
𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
√𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡
; 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 … 𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
 
3.2. REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
 
Once the correlations have been estimated we use them in order to investigate the 
effects of each economic measure on the correlations. Each regression contains dummy 
variables whose coefficients indicate the impact of each announcement in the country-
pair correlations. We also introduce in our regressions a dummy variable in order to 
investigate thoroughly if the dynamic behaviour of the correlation differs in each period 
of crisis. 
 
3.2.1. Trend regression 
 
First, we regress a time trend on the time-varying correlations to examine if they have 
changed over time. In this case the regression equation contains a constant and a time 
trend as an input. The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡(14) 
Where 
 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the dynamic conditional correlation 
 𝜔 is a constant  
 𝑇𝑡  is a time trend 
 
3.2.2. Regression equation with dummy variable “crisis” as an input 
 
We regress a dummy variable which allows us to analyze if the level of correlation 
differs between the two crisis periods. The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝐷𝑡
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡           (15) 
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Where 
 𝑫𝒕
𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔 is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 during the financial crisis 
(01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009) and the value 1during the sovereign debt crisis 
(01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
3.2.3. Regression equation with the ECB and the FED interest rates surprises 
 
We regress ECB and FED interest rates surprises on correlations to examine if they 
have had an effect on them. We distinguish between positive and negative surprises and, 
in the same equation, we introduce a dummy variable in order to explore differences in 
the effects between crises. The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡
+𝐸𝐶𝐵 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡
+𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑡
+𝐹𝐸𝐷 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑡
+𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑡
−𝐸𝐶𝐵 + 𝛼6𝐷𝑡
−𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶
+ 𝛼7𝐷𝑡
−𝐹𝐸𝐷 + 𝛼8𝐷𝑡
−𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡           (16) 
 
Where 
 𝑫𝒕
+𝑬𝑪𝑩 is a dummy variable that takes the value of positive surprises by the ECB 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
+𝑬𝑪𝑩.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value of positive surprises by the ECB during the sovereign 
debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒕
+𝑭𝑬𝑫 is a dummy variable that takes the value of positive surprises by the Fed 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
+𝑭𝑬𝑫.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value of positive surprises by the FED during the sovereign 
debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒕
−𝑬𝑪𝑩 is a dummy variable that takes the value of negative surprises by the 
ECB and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
−𝑬𝑪𝑩.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value of negative surprises by the ECB during the sovereign 
debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒕
−𝑭𝑬𝑫 is a dummy variable that takes the value of negative surprises by the Fed 
and 0 otherwise. 
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 𝑫𝒕
−𝑭𝑬𝑫.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value of negative surprises by the FED during the sovereign 
debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
3.2.4. Regression equation with the ECB, the FED and the BoE Quantitative 
Easings (QE) 
 
Quantitative Easings have become essential to mitigate the funding problems among 
peripheral countries within the sovereign debt crisis. We believe that this policy which 
has been promoted by central banks has had an important impact in the country-pair 
correlations that we have estimated. It is for this reason that we have decided to include 
a regression equation with the QE announcements as an input to investigate their effects 
on correlations. As we did previously, we have created a dummy variable in order to 
look into the differences on the impact of QE between the financial and sovereign debt 
crises. 
 
The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸
+ 𝛼2𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
𝛼3𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸
+ 𝛼4𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸
+ 𝛼6𝐷𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡           (17) 
 
Where 
 𝑫𝒕
𝑬𝑪𝑩.𝑸𝑬
 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a QE 
announcement promoted by the ECB and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
𝑬𝑪𝑩.𝑸𝑬.𝑪
 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is a QE announcement promoted by the 
ECB during the sovereign debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒕
𝑭𝑬𝑫.𝑸𝑬
 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a QE 
announcement promoted by the FED and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
𝑭𝑬𝑫.𝑸𝑬.𝑪
 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is a QE announcement promoted by the 
FED during the sovereign debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
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 𝑫𝒕
𝑩𝒐𝑬.𝑸𝑬
 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a QE 
announcement promoted by the BoE and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒕
𝑩𝒐𝑬.𝑸𝑬.𝑪
 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is a QE announcement promoted by the 
BoE during the sovereign debt crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
Is important to note that we are modelling the announcement impact effect, not the 
intensity of each QE due to the difficulties that could imply for the coefficients 
estimation process. 
 
3.2.5. Regression equation with Upgrades & Downgrades Rating 
 
Clearly upgrades and downgrades announcements made by rating agencies have 
become decisive to evaluate the financial solvency of each country and have had an 
important impact on their correlations. It is for this reason that we decide to introduce 
them as input variables in our regressions to analyse their effects on each country-pair 
correlation. The regression equation is as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖,1𝑟𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖,1𝑟𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶+𝛼3𝐷𝑖,1𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑝
+ 𝛼4𝐷𝑖,1𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛼6𝐷𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶
+ 𝐷𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝑈𝑝
+ 𝐷𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡           (18) 
 
Where 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟏𝒓𝒕
𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒏 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a downgrade 
announcement for the first country of each pair promoted by S&P and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟏𝒓𝒕
𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒏.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is a downgrade announcement for the first 
country of each pair promoted by S&P during the sovereign debt crisis 
(01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟏𝒓𝒕
𝑼𝒑
 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is an upgrade 
announcement for the first country of each pair promoted by S&P and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟏𝒓𝒕
𝑼𝒑.𝑪
 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
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o Takes the value 1 when there is an upgrade announcement for the first 
country of each pair promoted by S&P during the sovereign debt crisis 
(01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟐𝒏𝒅
𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒏 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a downgrade 
announcement for the second country of each pair promoted by S&P and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟐𝒏𝒅
𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒏.𝑪 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is a downgrade announcement for the 
second country of each pair promoted by S&P during the sovereign debt 
crisis (01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟐𝒏𝒅
𝑼𝒑
 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is an upgrade 
announcement for the second country of each pair promoted by S&P and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 𝑫𝒊,𝟐𝒏𝒅
𝑼𝒑.𝑪
 is a dummy variable that: 
o Takes the value 0 during the financial crisis (01/08/2007 – 31/12/2009). 
o Takes the value 1 when there is an upgrade announcement for the second 
country of each pair promoted by S&P during the sovereign debt crisis 
(01/01/2010 – 31/12/2013). 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Firstly, we show the value of the estimated parameters of the DCC model of Engle 
(2002) and then the estimated series of correlations for each pair of peripheral countries 
will be displayed. Thirdly, we also show descriptive statistics of correlations like 
deviation and trend in both periods of times considered. Finally, we show the estimated 
effects of news announcements on correlations. As we mentioned before, we analyze 
the impact of interest rates, QE and rating changes. 
 
4.1. THE DCC MODEL AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Figure 2 displays the country-pair correlations that have been obtained after estimating 
the DCC model for each pair of peripheral countries and each peripheral country with 
Germany as the European reference during the sample period. 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Note: This figure displays the estimated country-pair correlation for each pair of peripheral bond markets and each peripheral bond 
market with the German bond market. Source: own elaboration. 
 
As it is observed, all of the pair-wise correlations have in common that they start at high 
values at the beginning of the period of time analyzed. Then the correlations start to 
decrease until 2012, when there is a steep fall in correlations, for instance the deepest 
correlation values are observed in Greece-Germany and Italy-Germany correlations. 
Furthermore, last figure show us that Spain-Italy is the only pair-wise correlations 
which do not have negative values. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the estimated 
multivariate DCC model. Table 7 shows the optimal parameters for the mean and 
variance equations, which were presented in last section while table 8 displays the 
optimal parameters for the correlation equation. 
 
TABLE 7 
  𝜇   𝛾1  𝜔  𝛼 𝛽  
 
     
Estimated parameters for mean and variance equations  
Spain 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.118 0.868 
 
(0.626) (0.000) (0.659) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.278 0.669 
 
(0.873) (0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.669) 
Italy 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.516) (0.000) (0.433) (0.011) (0.000) 
Ireland 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.136 0.832 
 
(0.228) (0.319) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Portugal 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.142 0.831 
 
(0.464) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.063 0.933 
  (0.487) (0.450) (0.603) (0.021) (0.000) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. Source: own elaboration. 
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Results show that the autoregressive term in the mean equation,𝛾1, is statistically 
significant and positive for all countries except for Ireland and Germany. We observe 
that the parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are significant for all bond markets except for Greece, 
indicating that the GARCH (1,1) model fits well the data. (𝛼+𝛽) is lower than one for 
all countries indicating that the model is stationary. Moreover, coefficient 𝛽 is high for 
all countries indicating a high persistence of volatility. Table 8 presents the estimated 
parameters for the correlation equation. These parameters have been estimated for each 
country-pair. 
 
TABLE 8 
 
  
Estimated parameters for the correlation equation  
 
𝑎 𝑏 
Spain-Greece 0.079 0.918 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Germany 0.091 0.907 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Ireland 0.051 0.939 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Italy 0.115 0.870 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Portugal 0.073 0.924 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Germany 0.083 0.914 
 
(0.010) (0.000) 
Greece-Italy 0.083 0.914 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Portugal 0.102 0.897 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Ireland 0.031 0.966 
 
(0.012) (0.000) 
Ireland-Germany 0.047 0.948 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ireland-Italy 0.030 0.967 
 (0.007) (0.000) 
Ireland-Portugal 0.036 0.958 
 (0.017) (0.000) 
Italy-Germany 0.086 0.911 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy-Portugal 0.057 0.940 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Portugal-Germany 0.079 0.919 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
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We observe that both parameters, 𝑎 and 𝑏, are statistically significant, disclosing an 
important time-varying co-movement. Furthermore, the conditional correlations display 
high volatility persistence due to the value of parameter 𝑏b close to one. 
 
Next, we examine table 9 which contains a group of descriptive statistics for each 
country-pair correlation estimated, like the mean and the standard deviation that will 
help us to understand better the correlations behaviour. We have also estimated a 
regression equation for the conditional return correlations on a constant and a trend in 
order to reveal how much these correlations have changed over time. 
 
TABLE 9 
  
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Trend(*1000) 
t-
statistic 
 ∆ρ 
2007-
2009 
 ∆ρ 2010-
2013 
 
      
Dynamic Conditional Correlations descriptive Statistics         
Spain-Greece 0.487819 0.303729 -0.434 -39.06933 36.69% -44.55% 
Spain-Germany 0.269203 0.549962 -0.843 -45.10413 89.72% -5.27% 
Spain-Ireland 0.441407 0.210177 -0.179 -18.48802 42.74% -74.30% 
Spain-Italy 0.817952 0.129659 -0.0602 -9.421839 -10.27% 18.61% 
Spain-Portugal 0.588076 0.304954 -0.444 -40.52159 62.08% -50.26% 
Greece-Germany 0.161973 0.443188 -0.664 -42.9333 -222.50% -455.28% 
Greece-Italy 0.50202 0.306143 -0.476 -46.60857 13.40% -22.31% 
Greece-Portugal 0.542479 0.310263 -0.486 -47.44003 64.37% -43.02% 
Greece-Ireland 0.3923 0.188279 -0.21 -26.24131 122.49% -43.55% 
Ireland-Germany 0.180347 0.331907 -0.395 -28.79569 11.04% 67.10% 
Ireland-Italy 0.433066 0.171767 -0.168 -21.93839 42.57% -63.10% 
Ireland-Portugal 0.476632 0.197423 -0.211 -24.62393 54.56% -76.96% 
Italy-Germany 0.243195 0.518088 -0.771 -42.36921 132.14% 3.90% 
Italy-Portugal 0.552657 0.304958 -0.468 -45.19302 45.00% -50.73% 
Portugal-Germany 0.234916 0.477266 -0.764 -49.91161 83.08% 3.59% 
Note: ∆ρ is the difference between last and first values of each regression of conditional correlations and the t-statistic is associated 
to a time-trend. Source: own elaboration. 
 
Firstly, we observe that Spain-Italy and Spain-Portugal are the highest country-pair 
conditional correlations with mean values of (0.817952) and (0.588076) respectively 
while the lowest mean correlation values are observed in the country-pair correlations of 
peripheral countries and Germany, such as Greece-Germany (0.161973) and Ireland-
Germany (0.180347). Furthermore, the highest volatilities of conditional correlations 
are found in the country-pair correlations of peripheral countries and Germany, such as 
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Spain-Germany (0.549962) and Italy-Germany (0.518088). Secondly, we find a 
statistically significant decrease in correlations for all country-pair examined over the 
sample period, at the 5% level of significance, because of the negative trend coefficient 
estimated. The country-pair correlations of peripheral countries and Germany have the 
most negative slopes again like Greece-Germany (-0.664) and Spain-Germany (-0.843). 
Finally, we have measured this decreasing in correlation using the ∆ρ term which is the 
difference between de last and first values of each conditional correlation estimated. At 
the same time we have obtained this term for the two periods of time analyzed, the 
financial crisis (2007-2009) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2013). We find that the 
most important decrease in correlations take place in the sovereign debt crisis, 
suggesting that these countries have become less integrated during this crisis while 
during the financial crisis they became more integrated. Particularly interesting is the 
decrease in correlations found between Greece and Germany (-222.50%) during the 
financial crisis and (-455.28%) throughout the sovereign crisis. Furthermore, we find 
that the decrease in correlations between other peripheral countries and Germany is 
small suggesting that the level of integration of these countries with the European 
reference was stable. However, the level of integration within peripheral countries 
decreased. In addition these results suggest that the diversifications benefits of a 
portfolio which included bonds of these countries (Germany not included) might have 
increased during the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2013). 
 
We can conclude that the Greece-Germany country-pair correlation has experienced the 
deepest fall while Spain-Germany and Italy-Germany had the highest volatilities in their 
correlations. Moreover, the correlations among the peripheral countries decreased over 
the sovereign debt crisis but not those of the peripheral countries with Germany. 
 
4.2. CONDITIONAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
Next, we analyze the impact of the economic news announcements on the dynamic 
correlations during the crises and provide potential reasons for the correlation’s 
behavior during the sample period. We display a table for each regression equation 
introduced in last section. 
 
4.2.1. Interest rates results 
 
Table 10 shows the effect of interest rate “surprises” by the ECB and the FED during 
both crises. Firstly, we observe that positive surprises made by the ECB have a 
statistically significant and positive impact on the correlation of the majority of pairs 
examined with the exception of Spain-Italy during the total sample period. 
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TABLE 10 
 
𝛼𝑖
+𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝛼𝑖
+𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶  𝛼𝑖
+𝐹𝐸𝐷 𝛼𝑖
+𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶 𝛼𝑖
−𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝛼𝑖
−𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶  𝛼𝑖
−𝐹𝐸𝐷 𝛼𝑖
−𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶 
                  
ECB and FED interest rates 
Spain-Greece 0.041 -0.058 0.020 -0.027 -0.024 0.062 -0.240 0.274 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Germany 0.084 -0.155 0.037 -0.204 -0.061 0.127 -0.379 0.505 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Ireland 0.015 -0.023 0.006 -0.189 -0.006 0.028 -0.092 0.072 
  (0.000) (0.031) (0.163) (0.000) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) 
Spain-Italy 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.093 -0.004 0.008 -0.081 0.091 
  (0.985) (0.894) (0.000) (0.000) (0.160) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Portugal 0.039 -0.069 0.018 -0.112 -0.025 0.061 -0.203 0.225 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Germany 0.071 -0.117 0.035 -0.292 -0.046 0.090 -0.406 0.546 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Italy 0.052 -0.069 0.022 -0.278 -0.030 0.074 -0.228 0.314 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Portugal 0.048 -0.079 0.021 -0.203 -0.027 0.060 -0.217 0.261 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Ireland 0.014 -0.020 0.005 -0.088 -0.007 0.020 -0.057 0.014 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.080) (0.034) (0.103) (0.739) 
Ireland-Germany 0.050 -0.090 0.022 -0.182 -0.031 0.071 -0.261 0.385 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ireland-Italy 0.014 -0.023 0.006 -0.108 -0.006 0.026 -0.070 0.076 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.026) (0.016) (0.075) (0.000) (0.093) (0.128) 
Ireland-Portugal 0.012 -0.013 0.003 -0.088 -0.004 0.016 -0.070 0.011 
  (0.000) (0.144) (0.391) (0.024) (0.249) (0.028) (0.003) (0.771) 
Italy-Germany 0.069 -0.138 0.035 -0.251 -0.052 0.103 -0.377 0.451 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy-Portugal 0.046 -0.079 0.020 -0.126 -0.029 0.057 -0.207 0.247 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Portugal-Germany 0.076 -0.128 0.036 -0.271 -0.054 0.100 -0.393 0.516 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. Coefficients𝛼𝑖
+𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶 , 𝛼𝑖
+𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶  , 𝛼𝑖
−𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝐶  and 𝛼𝑖
−𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝐶refer to positive and negative monetary 
policy surprises by the ECB and the FED during the Sovereign debt crisis from 01/01/2010  to 31/12/2013. Source: own elaboration. 
 
However, when we look at the impact of positive surprises exclusively during the 
sovereign debt crisis, we observe that these surprises have a negative impact on 
correlations. The same result is obtained with positive surprises made by the FED. 
Correlations decrease in response to positive surprises by the FED during the sovereign 
crisis with the exceptions of Spain-Portugal and Italy-Portugal. So the correlation of 
Portugal with closer countries like Spain and Italy has not been affected by positive 
surprises by the FED. 
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If we look at the impact of negative surprises by the ECB, we observe that they have a 
negative effect on the country-pair correlations during the total sample period with the 
exceptions of Spain-Ireland, Spain-Italy, Greece-Ireland and Ireland- Portugal. 
However, during the sovereign debt crisis the impact on correlations is positive and 
stronger. Negative surprises made by the FED have a negative impact on dynamic 
correlations for all pairs examined with the exceptions of Greece-Ireland, Ireland-Italy 
and Ireland-Portugal. However, if we focus on the sovereign debt crisis, we find that 
negative surprises have a positive and stronger impact on correlations with the 
exception of the correlation between Ireland and the other peripheral countries, Ireland-
Italy and Ireland-Portugal which were statistically insignificant. 
 
To sum up this table, we find that, in general, positive surprises, i.e. negative news, 
made by the ECB and the FED during the sovereign debt crisis have a negative impact 
on dynamic correlations and provide diversification opportunities. However, negative 
surprises, i.e. positive news made during the sovereign debt crisis lead to an increase of 
correlations, decreasing the opportunities of diversification. This result suggests that 
during the sovereign debt crisis, peripheral countries reacted to positive news in the 
same way but differently to negative news. Also we find that the impact of surprises on 
correlations was higher during the sovereign debt crisis rather than the financial crisis. 
On the other hand, we observe that positive surprises by the ECB have stronger effects 
while the impact of negative surprises by the FED is higher. 
 
Finally, looking at the response of the country-pair correlations, we find that Ireland-
Portugal and Spain-Italy were less influenced by the ECB and the FED monetary policy 
surprises while Spain-Germany, Greece-Germany, Italy-Germany and Portugal-
Germany were the most influenced. 
 
4.2.2. Quantitative Easings (QE) results 
 
Table 11 shows the effect of income fixed purchases promoted by the ECB, the FED 
and the BoE during the sample period 2007-2013. This unconventional measure was 
implemented in order to mitigate the solvency problems of peripheral countries. We 
focus on the QE impact within the sovereign crisis (Coefficients 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 , 𝛼𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 
and 𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
). 
 
Firstly we find that QE announcements have had a negative impact on dynamic 
correlations of all country-pairs examined during 2010-2013, suggesting that 
diversification opportunities have increased after the QE purchases. 
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TABLE 11 
 
𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸
 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 𝛼𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸
 𝛼𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸
 𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 
              
ECB, FED and BoE Quantitative Easings (QE) 
Spain-Greece 0.272 -0.432 0.211 -0.488 0.117 -0.354 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.009) 
Spain-Germany 0.430 -0.952 0.568 -0.840 0.437 -0.705 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spain-Ireland 0.135 -0.205 0.164 -0.297 0.119 -0.203 
  (0.037) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.076) 
Spain-Italy 0.056 -0.085 0.021 -0.022 -0.124 -0.016 
  (0.234) (0.157) (0.347) (0.474) (0.178) (0.881) 
Spain-Portugal 0.195 -0.436 0.273 -0.470 0.112 -0.481 
  (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000) 
Greece-Germany 0.420 -0.656 0.387 -0.646 0.243 -0.450 
  (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
Greece-Italy 0.308 -0.587 0.262 -0.535 0.216 -0.393 
  (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Greece-Portugal 0.266 -0.278 0.220 -0.340 0.194 -0.482 
  (0.010) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece-Ireland 0.119 -0.178 0.101 -0.169 0.097 -0.274 
  (0.015) (0.118) (0.016) (0.005) (0.029) (0.011) 
Ireland-Germany 0.322 -0.606 0.378 -0.606 0.281 -0.411 
  (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ireland-Italy 0.122 -0.222 0.086 -0.182 0.047 -0.121 
  (0.079) (0.011) (0.050) (0.001) (0.393) (0.209) 
Ireland-Portugal 0.052 -0.105 0.105 -0.084 0.074 -0.214 
  (0.056) (0.346) (0.042) (0.223) (0.139) (0.050) 
Italy-Germany 0.365 -0.860 0.458 -0.633 0.318 -0.576 
  (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy-Portugal 0.270 -0.488 0.271 -0.457 0.196 -0.446 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Portugal-Germany 0.342 -0.667 0.497 -0.762 0.316 -0.463 
  (0.060) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. Coefficients 𝛼𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝐵.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
 , 𝛼𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
and𝛼𝑖
𝐵𝑜𝐸.𝑄𝐸.𝐶
refer to Quantitative Easings of the ECB, the 
FED and the BoE during the Sovereign debt crisis from 01/01/2010 to 31/12/2013. Source: own elaboration. 
 
If we analyze the QE promoted by the ECB, we observe that their impact was 
statistically significant for the majority of pairs with the exceptions of Spain-Ireland, 
Spain-Italy, Greece-Ireland and Ireland Portugal. We also observe that the higher 
impact of the QE executed by the ECB was produced in the correlations of the pairs 
Spain-Germany and Italy-Germany. This finding demonstrates that the assets purchased 
during the second stage summer-fall 2011 (40 billion € in Euro-denominated covered 
bonds, see Fawley, Neeley (2013)) were focused on Spanish and Italian debt. 
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Next, we look at the effects of QE announcements made by the FED. In March 2011 the 
Federal Reserve promoted a round of QE of about 600 billion USD in Treasuries. 
Results show that they had a statistically significant and negative impact on dynamic 
correlations with the exceptions of Spain-Italy and Ireland-Portugal. This decrease on 
the level of correlations appears to be related to the notion of “flight to quality effect”, 
i.e. that during times of increased uncertainty, investors tend to move towards less risky 
assets and so the return co-movement between assets becomes negatively correlated as 
Abad, Chulià (2012) and Beetsma et al. (2014) pointed out. 
 
Finally, if we analyze the impact of QE announcements implemented by the BoE we 
find that correlations decreased with less intensity that after QE promoted by the ECB 
and the FED and were statistically significant in all country-pair with the exceptions of 
Spain-Ireland, Spain-Italy and Ireland-Italy. 
 
As a summary, we find that QE announcements had a negative impact on correlations 
during the sovereign debt crisis suggesting diversification opportunities and a “flight to 
quality effect” due to the increase of the uncertainty. Also we observe that Spain-
Germany and Italy-Germany are the pairs which have been more affected by QE 
announcements during the sample period 2010-2013, especially by the unconventional 
measures promoted by ECB. Curiously, the correlations between Spain-Italy were not 
affected by QE announcements. 
 
4.2.3. Upgrades & Downgrades Rating announcements results 
 
Table 12 shows the impact of upgrades and downgrades announcements made by the 
S&P rating agency. Missing data means that there has not been any rating change 
during the sample period in that country. We will focus the analysis during the sample 
period 2010-2013. 
 
Due to both, the crisis and the financial and fiscal problems, the majority of rating 
changes on peripheral countries have been downgrades. Greece is the only peripheral 
country which had an upgrade, its effect on correlation was statistically significant and 
had a negative impact on its correlation with Spain and a positive impact with Germany. 
But we have to focus in all downgrades. We find that their effect on correlations was 
significant with the exception of Spain-Germany, Spain-Italy and Portugal with the rest 
of countries with the exception of Spain. 
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TABLE 12 
 
𝛼𝑖.1𝑟𝑡 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝛼𝑖.1𝑟𝑡 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶 𝛼𝑖.1𝑟𝑡 
𝑈𝑝
 𝛼𝑖.1𝑟𝑡 
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
 𝛼𝑖.2𝑛𝑑
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝛼𝑖.2𝑛𝑑 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶 𝛼𝑖.2𝑛𝑑 
𝑈𝑝
 𝛼𝑖.2𝑛𝑑 
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
 
                  
Panel Upgrades & Downgrades Rating of peripheral countries 
Spain-Greece - -0.230 - - -0.022 -0.006 - -0.173 
  - (0.006) - - (0.284) (0.938) - (0.000) 
Spain-Germany - -0.179 - - - - - - 
  - (0.231) - - - - - - 
Spain-Ireland - -0.251 - - -0.093 0.121 - - 
  - (0.001) - - (0.000) (0.018) - - 
Spain-Italy - -0.025 - - - -0.081 - - 
  - (0.434) - - - (0.224) - - 
Spain-Portugal - -0.369 - - - -0.136 - - 
  - (0.003) - - - (0.007) - - 
Greece-Germany -0.166 -0.224 - 0.257 - - - - 
  (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - - - - 
Greece-Italy -0.086 -0.142 - -0.183 - -0.300 - - 
  (0.000) 0.018 - (0.000) - (0.000) - - 
Greece-Portugal - -0.226 - -0.319 - -0.211 - - 
  - (0.021) - (0.000) - (0.052) - - 
Greece-Ireland 0.277 -0.255 - -0.043 0.117 -0.083 - - 
  (0.000) (0.002) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) - - 
Ireland-Germany 0.168 -0.523 - - - - - - 
  (0.000) (0.000) - - - - - - 
Ireland-Italy 0.086 -0.064 - - - -0.148 - - 
  (0.000) (0.026) - - - (0.000) - - 
Ireland-Portugal 0.064 0.113 - - - 0.000 - - 
  (0.000) (0.011) - - - (0.997) - - 
Italy-Germany - -0.517 - - - - - - 
  - (0.000) - - - - - - 
Italy-Portugal - -0.422 - - - -0.082 - - 
  - (0.000) - - - (0.131) - - 
Portugal-Germany - -0.170 - - - - - - 
  - (0.062) - - - - - - 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. Coefficients 𝛼𝑖,1𝑟𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶 , 𝛼𝑖 ,1𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
, 𝛼𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛.𝐶  and 𝛼𝑖,2𝑛𝑑
𝑈𝑝.𝐶
 refer to downgrades and upgrades in the 
rating of peripheral countries during the Sovereign debt crisis from 01/01/2010 to 31/12/2013. Sub index 1rt and 2nd indicate the 
country in each pair-correlation. Source: own elaboration. 
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If we analyse the results for each country, we find that Spain had the strictest impact of 
the downgrades on its correlation with Portugal. Ireland had the strongest impact on its 
correlations with Germany during the sovereign debt crisis but in the previous sample 
period we observed a rise in correlations with the European reference. Also this table 
shows that the correlation between Italy and other countries such as Germany and 
Portugal decreased because of the downgrades. 
 
To sum up, we find that Spain and Italy are countries that have been severely affected 
by the downgrades promoted by rating agencies. Furthermore, their effect was negative 
in most of the cases suggesting that the increased sovereign risk among peripheral 
countries lead to lower correlations and provided diversifications benefits if we invest in 
bonds of these countries. 
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5. SUMMARY 
 
Recent studies have analysed the integration of European Government bond markets 
during the sovereign debt crisis. Our study contributes to this literature providing a 
detailed analysis of the short-run interrelationships among Government bond markets of 
European peripheral countries. To this end, we have used the multivariate DCC-
GARCH model proposed by Engle (2002) in order to estimate the country-pair 
correlations and we employ daily yield bond data of each country during a sample 
period that covers both, the financial crisis (2007-2009) and sovereign debt crisis (2010-
2013). Then, we have used the estimated correlations as dependent variables in 
regression equations to investigate how the conventional and unconventional measures 
of monetary policy and the rating announcements have impacted on these bond markets 
during the period of turmoil. 
 
Our study reports some interesting findings. First of all, we have examined a group of 
descriptive statistics for each country-pair correlation estimated and we have also 
estimated a regression equation for the conditional return correlations on a constant and 
a trend in order to reveal if these correlations have changed over time. In the case of 
correlations, we have found that Spain-Italy and Spain-Portugal were the highest 
country-pair conditional correlations while the lowest correlation values were observed 
in the country-pair correlations of peripheral countries and Germany. This fact could be 
due to the “flight to quality” effect which suggests that investors tend to allocate their 
assets in safety bond markets during periods of turmoil. In the case of volatilities, the 
highest were found in the country-pair correlations of peripheral countries and 
Germany. Furthermore, we found that the most important decrease in correlations took 
place during the sovereign debt crisis, suggesting that these countries became less 
integrated during this crisis. However, in general, during the financial crisis they 
became more integrated. These results provide evidence of diversifications benefits of a 
portfolio which included bonds of these countries during the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Secondly, we have studied the impact of monetary policies and announcements made by 
central banks and rating agencies on each country-pair correlation during both crises 
considered. In the case of  interest rates “surprises” made by the ECB and the FED, we 
found that positive surprises during the sovereign debt crisis, i.e. negative news, had a 
negative impact on dynamic correlations and provided diversification opportunities 
while, negative surprises, i.e. positive news, lead to an increase of correlations, thus, 
decreasing the opportunities of diversification. Also, we found that the impact of 
surprises on correlations was higher during the sovereign debt crisis rather than the 
financial crisis. Moreover, we analysed the impact of QE made by the ECB, the FED 
and the BoE on correlations and we found that QE announcements had a negative 
impact on correlations during the sovereign debt crisis, suggesting diversification 
opportunities. 
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Finally, we explored the impact of upgrades and downgrades announcements made by 
the S&P rating agency and we found that the effect of the downgrades was negative in 
most of the cases suggesting that the increased sovereign risk among peripheral 
countries lead to lower correlations and provided diversifications benefits. 
 
Our results should help investors to make effective investment decisions, given that they 
need to have an understanding of the way in which monetary policy and rating 
announcements impact the interrelations of European government bond markets. 
Additionally, our findings should be of use to central banks to understand the effects of 
their monetary policy decisions on bond markets. 
 
. 
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7. ANNEX 
 
In this section we show last correlations estimated using the DCC methodology. In this 
case we analyze the current European debt crisis which is focused on Greek bond 
market given the increase of financial and uncertainty problems that Greek government 
have to pay back the FMI debt. Also, recently this government announced a citizen 
referendum to ask about his debt. We find interesting to investigate if have been 
financial contagion among peripheral countries during this period of turmoil. 
 
Furthermore we contribute the R-script which has been used to estimate DCC 
correlations. 
 
7.1. LAST SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS - 30 JUNE 2015 
  
We collect daily bond yields for three peripheral countries: Spain, Italy and Greece. We 
also collect data for Germany as a European reference.  The data runs from 19th January 
2015 through 30th June 2015. Weekend days are excluded. As a result, we have 116 
observations for each country. Last sovereign debt crisis has taken place during June 
2015 because of the difficulties that Greek government has to pay back the FMI debt. 
There are not many studies that had analyzed correlations and contagion of this period 
previously. Firstly we display in Figure 3 the daily evolution of the bond yields in the 
analyzed period for each country. 
 
FIGURE 3 
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Note:  Daily evolution of the peripheral and Germany bond yields. Source: own elaboration.  
 
As we see in last figure, all bond yields have increased in last week due to the raise of 
uncertainty among peripheral bond markets after Referendum announcement and FMI 
debt. 
 
Next figure 4 shows correlations estimated using DCC methodology proposed by Engel 
(2002) that allow us to investigate if there are any contagion symptoms of the Greek 
sovereign crisis. 
 
FIGURE 4 
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Note: This figure displays the estimated country-pair correlation for each pair of peripheral bond markets and each peripheral bond 
market with the German bond market. Source: own elaboration. 
 
As it is observed, Spain and Italy pair-wise correlations have in common that they are 
strongly affected by Greek bad news, showing the evidence of the contagion. Last data 
(30th June) reports an important raise on correlations between Spain-Greece and Italy-
Greece. This increase in correlations is followed with a drop fall of them in Spain-
Germany and Italy-Germany country-pair correlations because of the “flight to quality” 
effect that investors are looking for in Germany Bund. While the correlation between 
Spain and Italy remains stable during the period of time considered. 
 
7.2. DCC R-SCRIPT 
 
This section of the Annex will show the R-script information provided in order to 
execute the DCC methodology in all country-pair countries: 
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data<-read.table("germany-greece.txt", header=TRUE, sep="") 
 
# If you only want to work with some of the columns of the BDD, 
 
values <- cbind(data[1],data[2],data[3])  
 
# With " cbind " combine data columns and rows # rbind you do row 
 
# " Attach () " allows you to attach the BDD to search path R. So you can access each 
so you can access each of the elements of the BDD simply typing their names 
attach(values)  
data 
attach(values  
germany 
attach(values)  
greece 
 
# Data conversion to date format. The format % d / % m / % Y refers to d = day, m = 
month number , Y = 4-digit year 
 
date<-as.Date(data$data,"%d/%m/%Y")   
 
# Chart of the time series 
 
plot(date,germany,type="l",col="blue",main="Prices") 
plot(date,greece,type="l",col="blue",main="Prices") 
 
rendgermany <- diff(log(germany)) 
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rendgreece <- diff(log(greece)) 
 
date<-as.Date(data$data[-1],"%d/%m/%Y")  
 
#plot(Dates,rendibex)  
# Here I indicate which of the series of log- returns want to use. 
# In this case I selected all rows in the first column of the BDD val.ln  
# is to say, " val.ln [ have this empty space means I'm considering all rows , 1 = just 
want the first column ]"plot(date,rendgreece,type="l",col="blue",main="returns") 
 
returns = cbind(rendgermany,rendgreece) # rend combined in one vector 
 
# univariate normal GARCH(1,1) for each series 
garch11.spec = ugarchspec(mean.model = list(armaOrder = c(1,0)), variance.model = 
list(garchOrder = c(1,1), model = "sGARCH"), distribution.model = "norm")  
# for a ar(1) for instance: armaOrder=c(1,0) 
#for t student distribution: "std" 
#sGarch es el garch(1,1) estandart 
# dcc specification - GARCH(1,1) for conditional correlations 
dcc.garch11.spec = dccspec(uspec = multispec( replicate(2, garch11.spec) ), dccOrder 
= c(1,1), distribution = "mvnorm") 
dcc.garch11.spec 
 
dcc.fit2 = dccfit(dcc.garch11.spec, data = returns) 
 
# many extractor functions - see help on DCCfit object 
# coef, likelihood, rshape, rskew, fitted, sigma,  
# residuals, plot, infocriteria, rcor, rcov 
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# show, nisurface 
 
#class(dcc.fit2) 
#slotNames(dcc.fit2) 
#names(dcc.fit2@mfit) 
#names(dcc.fit2@model) 
 
 
# show dcc fit and estimated parameters 
dcc.fit2 
# conditional sd of each series 
# plot(dcc.fit, which=2) 
 
# conditional correlation 
# plot(dcc.fit, which=4) 
 
# extracting correlation series 
ts.plot(rcor(dcc.fit2)[1,2,]) 
write.table(rcor(dcc.fit2)[1,2,],file="correlaciones.csv") 
 
#show(rcor(dcc.fit2)[1,2,]) 
 
